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The separation of the Baltics from the So-
viet Union was a difficult process accompa-
nied by both political and economic conflicts. 
The third party in the negotiation process was 
represented by Germany and the USA. This 
article sets out to identify the role of the USA 
and Germany in the restoration of Baltic in-
dependence. Historicism and objectivity prin-
ciples serve as the methodological framework 
for the research. The regional approach was 
applied in order to integrate the features of 
regional development into the overall picture 
of world politics. The scientific and practical 
significance of the article lies in a scientific 
evaluation of the Soviet-Baltic relations in 
1989—1991. This study can help understand 
the mechanisms of formulation of foreign pol-
icy by the USA, Germany, and the USSR, as 
well as the practice of political interaction 
between these countries and the Baltic States. 
The materials and conclusions of this article 
can be used for further research on the for-
eign policies of the USA, Germany, the USSR, 
and the Baltic republics. In the process of the 
Baltics gaining their independence, western 
countries showed an ambivalent position and 
hesitancy regarding support for the struggle 
for liberation. As a result of internal contra-
dictions in the USSR, Baltic leaders managed 
to achieve independence without any effective 
support from western powers. The research 
significance of this study lies in a diverse se-
lection of sources and a new formulation of 
the problem of Baltic independence. The prac-
tical significance of the article results lies in 
the applicability of its materials in the devel-
opment of Russian foreign policy in the Baltic 
region, further research on the history of the 
Baltic region, Germany, and the USA, and 
preparation of lectures. 
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In 2011, the Baltic republics had been independent states for 20 years. 
The ‘divorce proceedings’ of the Soviet Union and the Baltic states ran ex-
tremely painfully, as a result of which today there are a lot of unresolved po-
litical, economic and military conflicts. The ‘Baltic issue’ was the Achilles’ 
heel for the international and domestic policy of the Soviet Union. The posi-
tion of the international community was crucial to the Soviet leadership. 
Measures taken by the Soviet leaders were not least based on the reaction of 
the major players on the international scene, Germany and the USA. The 
growing centrifugal tendencies in the Soviet Union forced its leadership to 
seek the support of Western leaders. The governments of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and the United States for their part had feared to openly sup-
port the struggle for the independence of the Baltic States. Each country pur-
sued its own interests in the dialogue with the Soviet Union and used the 
‘Baltic issue’ to manipulate the Soviet leadership while the Baltic States 
were relying on the help of the Western powers. The dual position of inter-
national actors in the acute relations between the USSR and its Baltic repub-
lics was manifested by the fact that the governments of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the United States became middlemen in the dialogue be-
tween the USSR and the Baltic States. 
However, in the national historiography the position and role of Ger-
many and the U. S. in the restoration of the independence of the Baltic States 
were virtually unexplored. Most of relations between the USSR and Ger-
many in the period of perestroika and the early 1990s in the research litera-
ture are discussed in the context of the reunification of the German state. The 
relations between the U. S. and the Soviet Union are analysed in the frame-
work of confrontation between the two blocs in political and military terms. 
The issue of acquiring independence by the Baltic States in a dialogue of the 
USSR, Germany and the United States remains unsolved; the position of the 
Western actors in a dispute with the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union in 
their struggle for independence has not become clearer. Thus, the aim of our 
study was to investigate the meaning of the ‘Baltic issue’ in the bilateral re-
lations in 1989—1991 between the USSR and Germany as well as the USSR 
and the USA as the main stakeholders in this issue. This problem was ana-
lysed based on the sources of personal origin, the memoirs and letters of 
politicians who used to take part in the events. Those are primarily the dia-
ries of A. Chernyayev, the assistant of Mikhail Gorbachev, in which he fo-
cused on the fight for the independence of the Baltic republics and provides 
his interpretation of the events noting the significance of assessments of the 
Western society to generate the political position of M. Gorbachev. A. Cher-
nyaev stresses that Gorbachev sought support in the ‘Baltic issue’ from the 
Western powers and found it in Germany [1]. The memories of the FRG 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher are of great interest [2] in which 
he addresses the problem of recognition of the independence of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania, the letter of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French 
President Francois Mitterrand [3]. The ‘Baltic point of view’ is represented 
by the collection of memories of the Baltic social and political activists of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s published in 2006 [4]. The U. S. role in tack-
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ling the ‘Baltic issue’ can be analysed on the basis of secret messages and 
phone calls collected by the American politician and historian S. Talbott and 
M. Beshloss. The authors emphasize that by pursuing the purpose of disinte-
grating the Soviet Union, the Bush administration did not hesitate to use any 
means. Based on the minutes of negotiations presented in the book, it can be 
concluded that the ‘Baltic issue’ was also used as a tool for manipulation of 
the Soviet leadership [5]. 
Western Europe and the U. S. did not recognise the inclusion of the Bal-
tic States into the Soviet Union, temporised on granting them independence 
in 1989—1991. This was due to the fear of a change of the course which was 
launched by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl reasonably believed that the open support to the independence 
of the Baltic republics on the part of Western Europe and the United States 
may result in a growing controversy in the Soviet leadership where there was 
no consensus on the ‘Baltic issue’; moreover, there was a growing dissatis-
faction with permanent climbdowns of M. Gorbachev in favour of the West. 
H. Kohl himself noted that although ‘the support of the Lithuanian popula-
tion in Germany is great, we need to build our policy in such a way that it 
does not run counter to the policy of Moscow’ [6, p. 377]. At the same time, 
Western politicians could not completely abstain from being supported by 
the Baltic peoples in their quest for independence as this, in turn, could lead 
to a decline in their popularity with the electorate who were full of enthusias-
tic feelings about the democratic processes taking place in the Soviet Union 
and Europe as a whole. That is why German Chancellor stuck to the policy 
of ‘small steps’ stating that ‘in the next five years due to the wisdom, pa-
tience and mental skills they [Baltic republics] will be able to achieve their 
goals’ [6, p. 379]. 
The American public and Parliament also demanded that President Bush 
would ‘let the Balts go’ [5, p. 145]. He also believed that ‘there are certain 
realities of life, and the Lithuanians used to know about them well, and they 
should negotiate’ [5, p. 147]. The position of the U. S. government was clear-
ly expressed by the U. S. President’s National Security Advisor B. Scowcroft: 
‘... Americans can only wish the Balts success because in terms of the U. S. 
national interests quite a lot was put on the balance’ [5, p. 198]. 
The Baltic politicians and public figures themselves were very disap-
pointed with the ambiguous position of the Western countries, especially 
Germany. Let us see how a member of the parliament ‘Sąjūdis’ and a mem-
ber of the Supreme Council of Lithuania Bronislaw Gyanzyalis described his 
impressions of the visit to Germany and a meeting with German politicians 
(including the German ‘Ostpolitik’ policymaker E. Barch), ‘The meetings 
were held according to all the rules of conspiracy... the Germans listened to 
us very carefully suggesting not to hurry and not to impede the democratisa-
tion process initiated by Gorbachev. It was obvious that the figures of both 
the opposition and the ruling majority in Germany would not have done any-
thing if we had been subject to retaliatory actions. Sympathy was the only 
thing we could hope for’ [7, p. 310]. 
M. D. Portnyagina 
95 
Indeed, the leadership of Germany was entirely for linking the ‘German’ 
and ‘Baltic’ issues. Germany set priorities in favour of good relations with 
Moscow, and therefore it was not in a hurry to recognise the independence 
of the Baltic republics. Promoting the processes in the Baltic States by the 
German leadership could complicate negotiations between Germany and the 
Soviet Union on the issue of German reunification. That is why the response 
to the Declaration of Independence adopted by Lithuania in March 1990 was 
the letter from Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mit-
terrand to the President of the Supreme Council of Lithuania V. Landsbergis 
with a request to suspend the declaration and enter into dialogue with the 
Soviet leadership [3]. At the same time, German diplomats tried to reassure 
the Soviet leadership that Germany was not going to interfere in the internal 
affairs of the Soviet Union. During the meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev with 
H. Teltschik, Chief Adviser to Chancellor on Foreign Policy stated that ‘in 
Europe no one was interested in the destabilisation which might arise due to 
Lithuania. Therefore, the German Chancellor was frank to say to Prunskiene 
that in place of the Lithuanian leadership he would not have taken such deci-
sions which had been taken by them’ [8, p. 515]. Lithuanian public figures 
called the statement of the German and French leaders the ‘death knell of all 
the hopes that the West will act for the benefit of Lithuania’ [9, p. 399]. The 
reaction of the U. S. government was more decisive in that case. The U. S. 
Congress decided to deprive Moscow of the most-favoured-nation until the 
Soviet Union begins negotiations with Vilnius [5, p. 201]. The ‘Baltic issue’ 
was used by the Americans to achieve economic benefits, because signing 
the trade agreement was at stake. During the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev in 
Washington in May 1990, President Bush agreed to sign the agreement only 
if there was a peaceful resolution of the ‘Baltic issue’ [5, p. 203]. 
By supporting Mikhail Gorbachev in the ‘Baltic issue’, H. Kohl was able 
to demonstrate his commitment to Gorbachev’s ‘perestroika’ and the inten-
tion to help in resolving the conflict between the Soviet Union and the Baltic 
republics. On the other hand, the ‘Baltic issue’ became a kind of lever for the 
FRG to put pressure on the Soviet leadership. The Baltic independence 
movement directly threatened the integrity of the Soviet Union. In that situa-
tion, the Soviet Union’s policy priorities had changed, and the topic of Ger-
man unity was no longer paramount. It was what the German politicians 
cleverly took advantage of in the negotiations on the reunification of Ger-
many and its membership in the NATO military bloc, ‘Given the results of a 
coherent policy of H. Kohl concerning the German question and specific 
problems in the USSR... The Soviet Union is prepared to accept membership 
of a united Germany in the changed NATO’ [10, p. 312]. 
Indeed, for the Soviet party leadership the ‘German issue’ was not as 
important as the ‘Baltic’ one. A. Chernyaev described the problem as fol-
lows, ‘The Baltic issue was extremely important for us because for the So-
viet Union it was crucially decisive like to be or not to be’ [11, p. 324]. 
In addition, the reaction of Western countries with regard to the situation 
in the Baltic was very important for Gorbachev. The ‘Baltic issue’ provided 
fodder for conversation at many meetings between the Soviet president and 
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his counterparts from Europe and America. M. Gorbachev himself very 
harshly criticised the processes occurring in the Baltic republics calling, for 
example, the Lithuanian politicians ‘not serious people, adventurers’. How-
ever, the mechanism of separation of the republics was already triggered, 
and it was impossible to solve the problem by signing a new treaty of union. 
Although the Lithuanian leadership made concessions because of the nego-
tiations with H. Kohl and froze the Declaration of Independence, the Lithua-
nian-Soviet talks ended inconclusively. The Soviet leadership was prepared 
to consider granting of independence in the constitutional process, without 
any prior concessions and refused to recognise the illegal occupation of the 
Baltic States. The relations between the Baltic States and the Soviet Union 
centre further aggravated after the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the 
RSFSR Boris Yeltsin supported the full sovereignty of Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia. 
However, even after the signing of the treaty of reunification of Ger-
many and the use of force in the Baltic region, Germany was slow to make 
any official statements in support of the independence of the Baltic repub-
lics. In response to the events in Riga and Vilnius in January 1991, the 
Chancellor carefully noted that ‘the further use of force will lead to confu-
sion and end the dialogue’ [6, p. 310]. This wait-and-see attitude was due to 
the on-going ratification of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to 
Germany in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Representatives of the Baltic 
republics were critical about that position of the Federal Chancellor. In an 
interview for the German magazine ‘Der Spiegel’ V. Landsbergis said, ‘Now 
we see that we cannot expect any serious support from Germany. The Ger-
man government is too focused on the Soviet Union’ [12]. 
The August coup in Moscow had the last word in the German leader-
ship’s hesitancy, when it finally became clear that the policy reforms of Mi-
khail Gorbachev failed and he would not be able to stay in power. Estonia 
and Latvia expressed their full sovereignty. Lithuanian Prime Minister 
K. Prunskiene, who was at that time in Bonn, urged the German leaders to 
take a final decision on the recognition of the independence of the Baltic re-
publics. [13] Only then the German government was able to re-prioritise its 
policies and abandon its unilateral support of the Soviet Union. German For-
eign Minister H. Genscher on 23 August contacted his Danish counterpart 
U. Ellemann-Jensen to discuss the restoration of diplomatic relations with 
the Baltic republics. It was just about the restoration of relationships and not 
about their establishment. The Americans decided to increase the pressure 
when they realised the failure of the Soviet policy. President G. Bush sent a 
letter to Mikhail Gorbachev urging to recognise the Baltic republics. At the 
same time, President G. Bush called President V. Landsbergis in Vilnius and 
said that the ‘recognition of Lithuania was getting close’. 
Diplomatic relations between the FRG and the three Baltic states were 
restored on 28 August 1991, when representatives of the Baltic republics 
came to Bonn for the formal signing of treaties. As early as 2 September, the 
German Embassies started to operate in Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius. That was 
before the official recognition of the independence of the republics by the 
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Soviet Union which occurred on 6 September. Since then Germany became 
the ‘chief patron’ of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the EU accession of 
these countries. As early as September 1991, during a brief visit to the Baltic 
States, Foreign Minister Helmut Genscher spoke for their associate member-
ship in the European Union with the apparent prospect of further full mem-
bership [2, p. 974]. In addition, in the initial phase the cooperation vector in 
the field of security became visible. In 1993, agreements were signed on the 
basis of bilateral cooperation that specifically addressed the issue of security, 
‘If there is a situation which, in the opinion of the parties, may endanger the 
freedom of... they [the states] can resort to mutual cooperation and coordina-
tion of their actions’ [14, p. 123]. In the early 1990s the Baltic region was 
intended to become ‘a single political and economic space, as well as a sin-
gle safety and security community... in particular, a solution could be in the 
democratisation of the Baltic Sea Region’ [15, p. 2]. The relations of the 
states in the cultural field had developed rapidly. In 1993, the agreements on 
cultural cooperation between Germany and the three republics were con-
cluded [16—18]. 
On 2 September 1991, George Bush declared the United States would be 
ready to establish diplomatic relations with the Baltic republics; as early as 
12 September the United States formally recognised them. At that, G. Bush 
said, ‘When history is written, nobody is going to remember that we took 
48 hours more than Iceland or whoever else it is’. [5, p. 311]. Since the res-
toration of diplomatic relations with the Baltic States, the USA began the 
process of military and political integration of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia 
in NATO. 
Thus, while the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Germany on 
the unification of the two German states were held, the German politicians 
were of the opinion that support the aspirations for independence of individ-
ual Soviet republics was ‘dangerous nonsense’ [6, p. 312]. The Baltics be-
came a unique mechanism of pressure on the Soviet leadership in the nego-
tiations on the reunification of the German state. Showing support for Mik-
hail Gorbachev in the ‘Baltic issue’, H. Kohl could hope for a speedy resolu-
tion of the ‘German question’ without any concessions from Germany. Kohl 
sought to solve the problem of the reunification of Germany in the most fa-
vourable way for their country also at the expense of the Baltic republics. 
Germany until the last moment did not recognise the independence of the 
Baltic republics, and only when it became clear that the Soviet Union was on 
the verge of collapse, German politicians officially declared the resumption 
of diplomatic relations. The Foreign Minister H. Genscher stressed that there 
was no need to recognise those states as Germany had never recognised their 
Soviet occupation. 
In the confrontation with the Soviet Union the United States actively 
utilised the ‘Baltic question’. It became the topic of discussions in all nego-
tiations and meetings between the two leaders. At that, the U. S. government 
was slow to deal with 'Baltic issue’ but raised it to either reassure the Ameri-
can public or obtain economic advantages in relations with the USSR. Brent 
Scowcroft recommended George W. Bush when dealing with Mikhail Gor-
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bachev ‘to use this telephone conversation to ‘once again come to light’ in 
the Baltic issue... When reporters learn about Gorbachev’s call, they will 
immediately ask if he has raised the Baltic question. And it would be better 
if the answer were ‘yes’, otherwise you’ll have to pay a damn expensive’ [5, 
p. 44]. Thus, the positions of Germany and the U. S. in the negotiations with 
the Soviet Union on the ‘Baltic question’ were very similar. Motivated by 
their own national interests, Western powers used the Baltic republics as a 
tool of pressure on the Soviet leadership. Germany aimed at achieving its 
own unity and the U. S. at obtaining the economic benefits. 
The leaders of the Baltic republics realised the hopelessness of the whole 
situation and the fact that you should not count on the active support of the 
German and U. S. governments. As a result, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
were able to achieve independence only through internal contradictions oc-
curring in the Soviet Union, with minimal assistance from the Western 
states. At the same time, the use of the ‘Baltic question’ in relations with the 
Soviet Union helped Germany more effectively solve the problem of their 
reunion. 
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